۲/Jun/2024

Tehran-Iran

The Islamic Republic lacks national legitimacy. The downfall of the Islamic Republic or a change in its behavior is a necessity. Otherwise, we would be paving the way for either the country’s collapse or the emergence of another dictator. This, however, entails national solidarity, a fact we all acknowledge. However, the current conditions of opposition political activity do not offer hopeful signs for creating an effective mechanism towards fostering national solidarity; instead, they wait for the government to collapse, akin to the Soviet Union, or to be militarily attacked, like Iraq. In this text, I attempt to address the most crucial dilemma of the current opposition, which fundamentally contradicts national solidarity.

In October 2022, amidst the protests dubbed “Women; Life; Freedom,” I was detained by the Ministry of Intelligence for the fourth time in three decades. Some interpreted those protests as an Iranian revolutionary upheaval, especially among the younger generation, against societal religious beliefs, a movement that manifested in the burning of women’s headscarves. Others, like in previous instances, saw these protests as the beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic and promised its downfall by the end of that year (2022). However, despite such promises, similar protests in December 2017 had faded from the headlines. During the two and a half months of my detention, I interacted with many protesting youths, and upon my release, I witnessed firsthand how detached the analyses of those events were from reality.

In August 2019, in a Farsi article titled “Transition from the Islamic Republic: From Illusion to Reality,” I referred to protests such as those in December 2017 and warned that potential events more widespread than that would not only lead to a regime change but also would not result in a change in the behavior of the government. I believed this because the prerequisites for regime change in Iran were not present, and the turmoil, along with the myriad flaws and pitfalls, had ensnared activists and the opposition political landscape. Since then, two nationwide protests have occurred in Iran (November 2019 and October 2022). Unfortunately, besides causing physical, mental, and spiritual harm to many citizens, these events have yet to yield the opposition’s claim of change.

Indeed, one of the main challenges faced by the Iranian opposition in its political endeavors, and often underestimated, is the misconception that there is widespread religious deconversion and disaffiliation occurring in Iran. Instead of recognizing the struggle as primarily political against the Islamic Republic regime, some perceive it as a battle against Islam itself. This misconception contributes to internal turmoil within the opposition movement. Their rationale for this perspective is that they believe people have become disillusioned with Islam and have abandoned their religious beliefs. They attribute this trend of deconversion and irreligiosity to the Islamic nature of the government and the entrenched power of clerics.

Consequently, they conclude that more emphasis should be placed on this “irreligiosity” to sideline the clerics and, as a result, dismantle the government. In essence, the struggle against the people’s way of life has become a “strategy” for ousting the clerics, enabling the opposition to seize “power” in this manner. I consider such absolutist arguments divorced from reality because Iranian society is highly diverse, and no segment—be it political or ideological—is homogenous. Furthermore, I see it as one of the schemes propagated skillfully by the Islamic Republic’s information apparatus and its infiltrators within the opposition to sterilize the idea of regime change and to void democracy and secularism of meaning and substance. Especially since some who beat such drums do not refrain from uttering scandalous insults or falsehoods, a vile practice that the Islamic Republic epitomizes by manipulating them against the opposition.

In essence, coercive persuasion aimed at religious deconversion is indeed unsustainable. Furthermore, it could potentially conflict with principles outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the values of democracy, which emphasize freedom of belief and expression. Moreover, communist countries have previously attempted to eradicate religions among the masses and failed. Contrary to some attempts in the virtual sphere to depict and promote the society’s religious deconversion in Iran, the reality on the ground is vastly different. What is transpiring in Iranian society bears no resemblance to religious deconversion; rather, it is a desire for liberation and an expression of aversion to the “political religion,” meaning the authoritarian government’s interference in people’s way of life, including the manner in which religious practices are conducted. In fact, the Islamic Republic promotes a regressive interpretation of religious norms that starkly contradicts many Iranian civil norms and their customary way of life, such as imposing specific forms of attire, especially on women. The Iranian people, in their protests, seek to disassociate themselves from the “religious discourse” that the government seeks to promote to coerce them into submission by weaponizing religion, seeking emancipation instead.

It’s undeniable that a portion of Iranian society, like many other societies, holds no belief in any religion or creed. However, this does not mean that all Iranians have turned away from their religion and faith. A significant portion of Iranians are Sunni Muslims who are deeply committed to their beliefs. Additionally, many Shia Muslims adhere firmly to their religious beliefs and, relying on those beliefs, vehemently oppose the rulers of the Islamic Republic. When examining the non-Muslim religious minorities in Iran alongside Muslim Iranians, it becomes evident that people in Iran do maintain religious beliefs. However, they oppose the intrusion of religion into politics and reject the concept of a politicized religion. The arguments of the opposition I mentioned earlier are mainly fabricated by cyber activists and those who are connected to the security apparatus of the Islamic Republic. They try to interpret opposition to the Islamic Republic as opposition to Islam. In this way, the Islamic Republic finds a basis to justify its existence to a large part of the society: “If the Islamic Republic don’t exist, your religion and faith will disappear.”

Similarly, the relationship between the people and the clerics follows the same pattern of behavior. The “government clerics” are the subject of people’s disgust and hatred, while the “non-government clerics” are respected and a source of public influence. The Islamic Republic fears its own members of the clergy the most. The government knows that the body of opposing clerics is extensive and influential, and their social and religious base among the people is strong. It is for this reason that the government imprisons and confines prominent religious authorities and critics using various tools, attempting to sever or minimize their connection with the general public. This clearly demonstrates that religious sentiments among a large portion of the Iranian people have not faded.

I, myself am one of those whom the government has sought to silence for 35 years, imposing restrictions on my communication with the public. I am not permitted to teach or speak even in small gatherings. Nonetheless, I have had an impact on Iranian society and activists, to which I will briefly allude:

• In July 2002, following suicide operations in Israel that resulted in the killing of some Israeli citizens, I issued a statement condemning those operations and emphasized the Jews’ right to ownership of Al-Aqsa Mosque based on Quranic verses, which led to some cultural and political activists speaking less fearfully about Iran-Israel disputes in academic, religious, and media forums. In this regard, an interview I had with Channel 12 Israel in January 2021 for presenting the calligraphed and gold-plated Book of Ezra to the Israeli religious leader HaRav Yosef, and emphasizing the longstanding relations between the two nations of Iran and Israel, encouraged domestic and foreign political activists to criticize the policies of the Islamic Republic against the people of Israel more courageously and some even traveled to that country without fear of being accused of being Zionists.
• In February 2005, in a statement for presenting the calligraphed and gold-plated Book of Psalms to the survivors of the September 11 victims (now housed in the Library of Congress). I wrote for the first time after the establishment of the Islamic Republic about the human rights of the Bahá’í community alongside other religions, which, although resulted in some critical reactions from the clerics, prompted some human rights activists to speak without fear about the human rights and citizenship of the Bahá’ís and defend them. These expressions of support reached their peak and spread to society when in April 2014, I illuminated a verse from the Bahá’í Holy Scriptures (The Kitab- i- Aqdas) in calligraphy and dedicated it to all Bahá’ís around the world, especially my fellow Bahá’ís in Iran, to be a symbolic and lasting document of respect for human dignity, friendship, and peaceful coexistence regardless of religious, sectarian, and creedal differences. (This painting is now kept in the Bahá’í World Center in Haifa).
• In June 2019, I sought to rally communities, political figures, and human rights activists in support of the rights of Christian converts by sending gold-plated pages from the Gospel of Matthew to the Vatican and organizing a statement for this purpose. Regrettably, the individual responsible for delivering the gift to the Vatican chose not to do so, motivated by personal reasons, and has since remained unresponsive to messages and calls. Had it not been for this unfortunate situation, support for Christian converts within Iranian society, particularly by political and human rights activists, could have garnered further attention to their plight. Unfortunately, this did not occur, leaving these individuals under heightened pressure and seemingly invisible to civil society, political activists, and human rights advocates in Iran. I hope that this account will shed at least some light on the situation facing these individuals.

These instances suggest the potential impact of my actions and engagements within Iranian civil and political society. Shiite and Sunni clerics critical of the Iranian government have also made significant impacts on Iranian society due to their positions and popularity. However, it’s unfortunate that some political and media activists either overlook or deny these impacts, or they try to claim credit for them without acknowledging their true source.

Unfortunately, some opponents of the Islamic Republic, whether intentionally or unintentionally, fail to recognize this social reality: Firstly, the Iranian government, despite using Islam in its name, is not inherently religious but rather exploits religion for political purposes. This is evident in its willingness to bomb religious sites or desecrate sacred symbols if it serves its political agenda, actions that have occurred repeatedly over various periods, with documented evidence.

Secondly, it’s important to clarify that being religious or holding a clerical position doesn’t equate to supporting the government in any way. Many religious individuals strongly oppose the Islamic Republic regime, and there are numerous clerics who have either opposed the regime or criticized its policies. I have documented and published the names of several clerics who have faced execution, imprisonment, detention, and restrictions since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. While many people in Iranian society maintain their religious beliefs, they not only refrain from supporting the government but also reject the religious ideology promoted by it. Similarly, government-affiliated clerics, whether reformist or hardliner, are generally disliked by the public, whereas non-governmental clerics are respected and wield influence to a considerable extent.

These religious believers who oppose the government are mostly the same ones I referred to as the “silent majority” in my 2019 article, and today, they are referred to as the “gray zone.” Most of these individuals advocate for transitioning from the Islamic Republic to a type of government where the principles of the UN human rights are respected and implemented. However, if certain factions within the opposition focus more on anti-Islamism and religious animosity rather than advocating for the separation of religion from the state, promoting tolerance, peaceful coexistence, and engaging in political activism against the entrenched regime of the Islamic Republic, it can lead to apprehension among a significant portion of the Iranian population regarding the ethical and social landscape of the country post-Islamic Republic. Consequently, this may hinder wholehearted support for the opposition.

In 2016, I took a symbolic action and in my meetings with most of Iran’s religious and spiritual leaders, I stressed that our national solidarity is contingent upon the respect for human dignity, which can only be achieved through religious equality for all citizens. This includes Shiite or Sunni Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Baha’is, Mandaeans, or Yazidis in Iran. Any exclusionary attitude towards any religious or spiritual denomination, even those who do not adhere to any belief system, will inevitably inflict irreparable damage to the cultural-national foundations and territorial integrity of Iran. It is our collective responsibility to prevent conflicts based on religious, sectarian, political, ethnic, linguistic, or gender differences. Such conflicts are detrimental to transformative movements and should be avoided at all costs.

Given my limited connection with various segments of the Iranian population, including followers of different religions, denominations, and even atheists, I advise seasoned political and civil activists to avoid falling into the trap set by individuals or groups seeking to sow discord based on religion, politics, ethnicity, or gender. By distancing themselves from such entities and ideologies, and by taking transparent stances for public scrutiny, they can help pave the way for achieving national unity in pursuit of political change and transformation in Iran. It’s important to recognize that no society can be coerced into adopting a particular ideology or belief system, whether religious or anti-religious, without provoking resistance from the majority. In Iran, national solidarity toward any transformation cannot be achieved by alienating or excluding any particular group, especially religious ones. Therefore, the absence of critical and dissenting religious and spiritual leaders and activists (who have endured significant hardships since the establishment of the Islamic Republic) is a notable weakness within the Iranian opposition over the past four decades.

It must be acknowledged that the prospects for bringing about regime change in Iran, or even altering its behavior, have not improved. The ongoing turmoil among activists and the nature of oppositional political activities have not only remained unresolved but have intensified in recent years. The lack of an organization capable of garnering acceptance and trust from various segments of Iranian society is an undeniable challenge. The political landscape in Iran seems to favor opportunists rather than trailblazers. Amidst this chaos, the push for de-Islamization has further exacerbated the political crisis within the opposition to the Islamic Republic. Are those involved in this fragmentation aware that their actions may inadvertently serve the interests of the Islamic Republic?

Regrettably, the political factions within the opposition frequently portray a distorted image of Iran’s multifaceted society and its requirements. This distortion impedes the establishment of national unity and the creation of an inclusive organization that can effectively represent and lead all sectors of Iranian society. This distortion not only misrepresents the rich tapestry of Iranian society but also overlooks its diverse needs and aspirations. By failing to accurately reflect the realities on the ground, these political factions hinder the crucial process of forging national unity. Without a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of Iranian society, it becomes challenging to establish an inclusive organization capable of effectively representing and leading all segments of the population.

Until the prerequisites for change are established—where political rationality supplants turmoil and fragmentation within the opposition, and where the diverse faiths and lifestyles of all Iranians are respected—a significant portion of the population will remain hesitant to align with the existing opposition. The demise of the Islamic Republic will only occur when the opposition earns widespread recognition as an entity that acknowledges the historical legacy of political dissent, including the contributions of dissenting clerics. This must be coupled with a commitment to safeguarding individuals’ freedom of conscience regarding religious matters and ensuring their social and religious security within the framework of a secular democratic government.

Therefore, what’s needed is an organization capable of fostering national unity and providing effective leadership—one that can earn the trust of the public, among both secular and religious circles, and guide them forward without succumbing to divisive religious ideologies. However, such unity is unwelcome to the rulers of the Islamic Republic, who, over the past four decades, have consistently undermined solidarity with the allure of deceit, spreading rumors, making false accusations, and propagating baseless slogans.